By Eric G. Lasker, Stephen A. Klein, and Tamara Fishman Barago Eric Lasker is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm Hollingsworth LLP, where he has represented clients in pharmaceutical products liability litigation involving antipsychotics, antifungals, antiepileptics, cancer medications, cough/cold treatments, introcular and contact lenses, and obstetrical drugs. Mr. Lasker has been recognized as an American Lawyer ''Litigator of the Week,'' a Bloomberg News ''Rainmaker,'' and as one of Law360's Products Liability MVPs for 2013. Stephen Klein is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm Hollingsworth LLP, where he defends complex cases and mass torts involving pharmaceutical and medical device products liability. He also represents corporate policyholders in insurance coverage disputes and has frequently written in the field, authoring a number of articles and treatises to assist policyholders in maximizing their insurance recoveries. Mr. Klein also practices in the field of government contracts. Tamara Fishman Barago is an associate with the Washington, D.C. firm Hollingsworth LLP. She specializes in the defense of complex serial and mass tort litigation across the country -primarily personal injury litigation involving pharmaceutical products -and she has significant experience with all facets of the litigation process, including pretrial fact and expert discovery, motions practice, trial preparation, and appellate work. Ms. Barago is also active in pro bono work with several organizations in the Washington, DC area. P LAINTIFF files a lawsuit claiming that her use of a prescription medication caused her to sustain injuries. Brand Pharmaceuticals did not manufacture the drug and therefore cannot be liable to Plaintiff, right? Not necessarily. Two emerging theories of liability, socalled ''innovator liability'' and ''co-promoter liability,'' aim to hold a nonmanufacturer responsible for injuries caused by another company's pharmaceutical product. Under innovator liability, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused by a competitor's generic version of its brand drug based on its supposed responsibility for the drug's prescribing information. Under co-promoter liability, a company that contracts to market another manufacturer's pharmaceutical product may be liable based solely on its marketing activities. This article explores the theories underlying these novel sources of liability and proposes business strategies to consider that could help mitigate these emerging risks.
I. Traditional Tort Doctrine
Limits Product Liability to the Manufacturer of the Product.
By asserting innovator and co-promoter liability, plaintiffs are attempting to circumvent well-established tort law principles. It is axiomatic that ''[a] fundamental principle of traditional products liability law is that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant supplied the product which caused the injury.'' 1 A plaintiff suing for alleged injuries from a pharmaceutical product (or medical device) must identify the actual defendant that manufactured the product she alleges injured her. 2 When advancing theories of innovator and co-promoter liability, plaintiffs target defendants they acknowledge played no role in manufacturing or supplying the drug that allegedly caused their injury. These theories require courts to suspend traditional tort law doctrines of causation and duty and have, for that reason, largely been rejected. However, as discussed below, a handful of jurisdictions have viewed these theories more favorably.
II. Innovator Liability Against
Brand approval for those drugs. Instead of having to leap the same clinical hurdles as the original drug sponsor, generic manufacturers need only demonstrate that their product is ''the same as'' an existing brand drug, meaning that it is bioequivalent to its brand counterpart and has the same active ingredient(s), route of administration, dosage form, and strength. 4 Other than routine information reflecting the different manufacturer or distributor, the generic drug also must have ''the same'' prescribing information, i.e. label, as the brand drug (i.e., the reference listed drug) on which its approval was based.
5
This requirement of ''sameness'' is key to two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing federal preemption that appear to have reinvigorated innovator liability arguments. In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court held that FDA's approval of a brand drug's prescribing information did not preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims because the brand manufacturer had discretion under FDA's ''changes being effected'' (CBE) regulation to unilaterally strengthen a drug warning. 6 Two years later, however, the Court held in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, that failure to warn claims against generic manufacturers were preempted because -due to the HatchWaxman Act's sameness requirementgeneric manufacturers cannot use the CBE process to unilaterally change their labels.
7
In the post-Hatch-Waxman age, approximately 80% of prescriptions are filled with generic pharmaceuticals.
8 After Mensing, failure-to-warn claims involving a generic pharmaceutical should be preempted, arguably denying consumers of such products an effective remedy if they believe they were injured by the drug.
9 Enter innovator liability. 4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (West) (describing the information required for abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs)). 5 Id.
6 See 555 U. S. 555, 558-559 (2009 
C. The Key Areas of Dispute
Although the courts considering innovator liability have addressed the laws of dozens of states, their reasoning usually boils down to their views on three basic principles.
Are All Product-Based
Injury Claims Product Liability Claims?
The majority of courts rejecting the theory hold that where the alleged cause of the injury is a product, the resulting claim necessarily sounds in product liability, no matter how the plaintiff seeks to characterize it.
18 Plaintiffs cannot pin liability on a non-manufacturer of a brand drug through semantic wordplay seeking to separate the product from the alleged injury.
A minority of courts, however, views matters differently. For example, the Weeks court stated that Alabama's product liability doctrine ''did not subsume a commonlaw negligence or wantonness claim'' or a claim for ''fraudulent suppression,'' and therefore plaintiff's claims against the brand manufacturer would not be ''governed by the principles'' of Alabama product liability law.
19 These minority This logic is most certainly wrong and misunderstands the fundamental nature of pharmaceutical products. Comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that prescription pharmaceuticals are unavoidably unsafe products, and thus they are neither defective nor ''unreasonably dangerous'' so long as they are ''properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning. '' 22 In other words, a drug's warning cannot be separated from the product itself; it is an inherent part of the pharmaceutical product, i.e., the means by which these otherwise unavoidably unsafe products are rendered non-defective. Nonetheless, in the minority jurisdictions, a plaintiff's artful pleading is sufficient.
Does a Brand Manufacturer
Owe A Duty to the Consumer of a Generic Drug?
Even if claim(s) involving products do not have to be governed by products liability principles, most courts still recognize that a brand manufacturer owes no duty to consumers of generic drugs because it has no nexus with such consumers and no control over the products to which they are exposed. The Fourth Circuit found ''no legal precedent for using a name brand manufacturer's statements about its own product as a basis for liability for injuries caused by other manufacturers' products, over whose production the name brand manufacturer had no control. '' 23 The Tenth Circuit rejected innovator liability based on negligent design because ''[t]he brand-name manuIllinois common law compels a court to construe Plaintiff's common law negligence claims as product liability claims . . ..''); Kellogg, 762 F. Supp.2d at 704 (''Vermont has not eliminated common law actions for negligence or fraud merely because they involve products.''); Chatman, 960 F. Supp.2d at 652 (finding brand manufacturers ''not manufacturers'' for purposes of plaintiff's misrepresentation claims and therefore Mississippi's product liability statute did not apply). 20 2014 WL 4055813, at *16. 21 Id. at *17; see also Dolin, 2014 WL 804458, at *8 (noting that brand manufacturer GSK's alleged negligence, regarding its design and warning label, ''is extrinsic to the Paxil manufacturing process, and, if true, it could proximately cause injury to consumers of all versions of paroxetine, including the generic version that Mr. Dolin ingested''). The minority courts have attempted to skirt these basic principles through the concept of ''foreseeability,'' i.e., brand manufacturers can foresee that their inadequate warning will harm users of the generic equivalent to their products. 25 But, as the Fourth Circuit held in Foster, the traditional tort law concept of duty still trumps an expanded notion of foreseeability. To impose a duty to consumers of another manufacturer's products ''would be to stretch the concept of foreseeability too far.'' 26
Do Public Policy
Considerations Support Innovator Liability?
To the majority courts, public policy concerns ''weigh against holding namebrand competitors liable for injuries caused by their generic competitor's drug. '' 27 As the Foster court explained, imposing innovator liability ''would be especially unfair'' when ''the generic manufacturer reaps the benefits of the name brand manufacturer's statements by copying its labels and riding on the coattails of its advertising. '' 28 By contrast, the outlier courts have argued that the brand manufacturer has ''been compensated for taking responsibility for [the generic drug's] design and warning label with an extended period of government-impacted monopoly privileges in connection with the sale of its [brand drug].'' 29 Moreover, these courts point to the brand manufacturer's alleged moral culpability, which makes it ''not fundamentally unfair'' to hold them liable.
30
But, as the Huck court cautioned, to make brand manufacturers liable to consumers of generic drugs ''would alter the relationship between generic and brand manufacturers'' created by Congressional legislation and ''discourage investments necessary to develop new, beneficial drugs 24 Shrock, 727 F.3d at 1282. 25 See, e.g., Kellogg, 762 F. Supp.2d at 708-709 (finding it ''reasonably foreseeable'' a physician will rely on a brand manufacturer's representations about its drug when prescribing that drug for a patient, ''regardless of whether the pharmacist fills the prescription with a generic form of the drug''); Weeks, 2014 WL 4055813 at *17 (''an omission or defect in the labeling for the brand-name drug would necessarily be repeated in the generic labeling, foreseeably causing harm to a patient who ingested the generic product.''). 26 Foster, 29 F.3d as 171. 27 Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285. 28 29 F.3d at 170 (noting that brand manufacturers alone ''undertake the expense of developing pioneer drugs, performing the studies necessary to obtain premarketing approval, and formulating labeling information''); see also Huck, 850 N.W. 2d at 378-379 (noting that brand manufacturers, ''who incurred the costs to develop [brand drug], do not profit from PLIVA's sale of the competing generic formulation'' and have no control over PLIVA). 29 Dolin, 2014 WL 804458, at *6. The HatchWaxman Act did create a post-approval exclusivity period for brand drugs separate from (though not necessarily in addition to) the patent term as a trade-off for generic drugs' easier entry into the market. (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) ; see id. at 67988 (citing as reasons for the regulation (a) the ''tension'' now between the requirement that generic drugs have the same labeling as the reference listed drug and the need for the ANDA holder ''to be able to independently update its labeling as part of its independent responsibility to ensure that the labeling is accurate and up-to-date,'' (b) the need to incentivize generic companies to be pharmacovigilant, especially since data supporting labeling changes may become available after generics enter the market, and (c) the fact that, after Mensing and Levine, ''access to the courts is dependent on whether an individual is dispensed a brand name or generic drug''). 34 However, the proposed regulation also could change the generics industry model by effectively requiring generics to engage in brandlevel pharmacovigilance and post-market trials, increasing costs and putting some manufacturers out of business -thereby betraying the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. See Comments re: 78 Fed. Reg. 67985 at 19-22, Generic Pharmaceutical Association (Mar. 13, 2014) (''GPhA cmt.''). The rule also would undermine the Hatch-Waxman ''sameness'' requirement by allowing generic labeling to differ, at least temporarily, from that of the reference listed drug or brand drug, causing ''unnecessary confusion'' when multiple versions of safety warnings for the same products are allowed to exist simultaneously on the market. Comments re: 78 Fed. Reg. 67985 at 2, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (Mar. 11, 2014) (''PhRMA cmt.''); see also GPhA cmt. at 5-9. In addition, by requiring the generic manufacturer to send proposed label changes to the brand manufacturer at the same time they are submitted to FDA, the regulation theoretically could subject the brand manufacturer to litigation over labeling decisions made by competing generics manufacturers for their own drugs. 
III. Co-Promoter Liability
Co-promoter liability is another emergent theory that targets a defendant that did not manufacture, distribute, or sell the product allegedly causing the plaintiff's injury. A ''co-promoter'' contracts with the drug's manufacturer to promote the drug when the manufacturer, for whatever reason, does not have the necessary marketing apparatus. For example, a foreign manufacturer seeking to sell its drug in the United States may seek the assistance of an American marketer with a well-established network of sales representatives. The manufacturer and the co-promoter enter into a contractual relationship whereby the copromoter agrees to disseminate information about the drug to prescribing physicians and other health care organizations.
The theory behind co-promoter liability is that co-promoters are ''essential to the marketing, selling, and distribution'' of the drug and, along with the manufacturer, are ''in the best position to give doctors and patients the information they need to make informed decisions.'' 38 Courts have had less opportunity to consider copromoter liability than innovator liability, but a recent case in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana could change that. In multi-district litigation, a federal jury handed down a $9 billion punitive damages award, initially upheld by the MDL court, against both Takeda, the Japanese manufacturer of the prescription diabetes drug Actos, and Eli Lilly, the U.S. promoter of the drug, for failing to warn about the risk of bladder cancer.
39
The court later reduced the punitive damages award based on due process concerns, resulting in a total damages award of $36.8 million, but not before the shock of the initial 10-figure award had reverberated throughout the pharmaceutical industry and the plaintiffs' bar. 40 The Fifth Circuit recently dismissed an appeal after Takeda announced a pending $2.4 billion settlement of most Actos suits.
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In upholding the judgment against the co-promoter, the district court pointed to the fact that Lilly was Takeda's sole marketing arm in the US and ''the sole provider of marketing information to physicians in the United States about 37 See Jeff Overley, Generics Lobby Threatens Suit Over FDA Warning Labels Plan, LAW360 Sept. 23, 2014, available at http://www.law360. com/articles/579957/generics-lobby-threatenssuit-over-fda-warning-labels-plan (last accessed May 19, 2015) . Actos;'' that Lilly ''detailed'' plaintiff's physicians ''multiple times'' before they prescribed her the drug; and that Lilly's role was ''active,'' not passive, i.e., Lilly did more than merely pass on Takeda's information about the drug. Lilly was involved in ''developing the strategy for responding to the FDA's requests'' and communicated with Takeda Japan about Actos at ''the highest executive levels. '' 42 The court concluded that Lilly was not ''a simple marketer'' of Actos, just ''taking orders from Takeda and carrying them out,'' but instead was actively involved in regulatory activities for the drug.
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Lilly argued that any claims against it were preempted because, following the rationale of Mensing, it could not unilaterally change the Actos label. 44 The court rejected this defense, concluding that because Lilly is not a generic drug company, ''the underlying rationale at play'' in Mensing does not apply. 45 Judge Doherty rejected the argument that a copromoter is limited to sharing with prescribing doctors only the information contained in the NDA holder's label, noting that, in practice, sales pitches and marketing efforts were ''not limited to the label, per se'' but instead merely had to contain information that was ''consistent with the label. '' 46 To the court, this provided enough room for the possibility that Lilly could have provided a stronger warning to physicians than that contained in the Actos label: ''Lilly has not identified any statutory provision, regulation, or rule, nor any controlling applicable jurisprudence compelling this Court to conclude that Lilly could not vary its marketing literature in any way, whatsoever, from the languaging of the insert label. '' 47 The co-promotor liability theory has not been endorsed as yet by any other court, and there are a handful of cases in which it has correctly been rejected.
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Claims against co-promoters should be rejected because, as with innovator liability, co-promoters do not manufacture, sell, 42 In re Actos, 2014 WL 4364832, at *12-*13. 43 Id. at *19. The court also highlighted plaintiff's argument that Lilly was aware of suspicions of a connection between Actos and bladder cancer as early as 1999 (per a slide deck acknowledging it as a ''significant adverse event'') but provided no warnings in its marketing or in discussing Actos with physicians and instead agreed to withhold information about bladder cancer from distributors and doctors. Id. at *12-*13. 44 Indeed, FDA regulations do not even address co-promoters, let alone authorize them to change label warnings. The only regulation that applies to any type of ''nonapplicant,'' i.e., an entity other than the sponsor of the New Drug Application, applies to ''manufacturer [s] or distribute the product in question. Also, despite the Actos court's quick dismissal of the argument, Mensing should be instructive. A co-promoter has no more ability to independently control a drug's labeling than does a generic drug manufacturer.
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In several OxyContin cases, however, the co-promoter, Abbott, was granted summary judgment not because the court found plaintiffs' co-promotion theory of liability non-viable, but because Abbott's co-promotion efforts could not be tied to the decisions of plaintiffs' prescribing physicians in those particular cases.
50 These cases leave the door open for recognition of the theory in the right fact setting.
51 Given the potentially large payday as evidenced by the Actos jury's initial award, it is likely that other plaintiffs will attempt to follow the Actos model to hold co-promoters responsible for injuries allegedly caused by drugs they did not manufacture, sell, or distribute.
IV. Potential Business Strategies to Mitigate Risk
Given the emergence of these outlier theories of liability, it may be prudent for both manufacturers and co-promoters of brand pharmaceutical products to factor these litigation risks into their business strategies. There are a number of potential strategies that might be considered.
A. Business Strategies Addressing the Risk of Innovator Liability
When a New Drug Application is past patent and no longer factors into the company's business plans, a company may wish to divest the NDA in order to limit potential innovator liability. Under 21 C.F.R. § 314.72, a new drug applicant can transfer ownership of its application, at which point the new owner assumes regulatory responsibilities for the drug. If business interests weigh against divesting or formally withdrawing an NDA, brand manufacturers might consider other steps to minimize their risk, such as aggressively engaging in pharmaco-vigilance in cooperation with generic manufacturers. While this would provide brand manufacturers with more safety data that might inform future labeling changes, it arguably also would put brand manufacturers in the role of policing generic manufacturers' conduct, raising many of the same concerns that have been voiced about the FDA's proposed new generics labeling rule. In addition, there may be practical impediments to obtaining meaningful and complete safety data from generic manufacturers.
B. Business Strategies
Addressing the Risk of Co-promoter Liability A co-promoter can minimize its liability risk by taking care that the co-promotion agreement clearly defines the limits of its power and responsibilities with respect to the promoted drug and by bargaining for the strongest possible indemnity agreement from the product's manufacturer.
Under the Actos court's reasoning, a copromoter's litigation risk will turn in significant part on the extent to which it involves itself in labeling, safety, or regulatory decisionmaking over a drug. For example, a co-promoter whose only role is to use promotional materials developed and/or approved by the innovator will have a strong argument that it is ''a simple marketer'' that just ''tak [es] orders from [the innovator] and carr[ies] them out. '' 58 On the other hand, a copromoter that has the ability to review and comment on the drug approval application or regulatory communications and to attend and participate in FDA meetings would have a more difficult argument.
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Accordingly, a co-promoter must think carefully before seeking or accepting such rights or responsibilities. A co-promoter should only agree to a more active role when there are identifiable business reasons for doing so.
A co-promoter should also negotiate an indemnification agreement that accounts for the arguments raised against Lilly in the Actos litigation. A co-promoter should not settle for boilerplate language that generally indemnifies it for liability absent evidence of its own wrongful conduct. Rather, the indemnification provision should explicitly address potential co-promoter liability arising both for the specific responsibilities the co-promoter is assuming under the contract and from responsibilities that the copromoter is not assuming. Depending on the parties' broader business interests, the specific indemnities offered for different alleged conduct might be different. By clearly defining these indemnifications, however, the co-promoter (and the manufacturer) will have a better understanding of 57 See 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67993 (''It should be noted that if an NDA holder has discontinued marketing a drug product, but approval of the NDA has not been withdrawn under § 314.150, the NDA holder still must comply with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.''). 58 In re Actos, 2014 WL 4364832, at *19. 59 See id. at *19 (highlighting the fact that Takeda and Lilly ''exchanged information and communicated'' during the regulatory history of Actos). their potential legal liabilities and can avoid contractual disputes in the unfortunate event that products liability litigation occurs.
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Beyond securing a suitably-tailored indemnity, co-promoters may consider such steps as providing clear, written instructions to their sales representatives to only use and discuss information prepared by the manufacturer and (notwithstanding the Actos court) that is contained in the prescribing information for the drug, and to clearly document that all of the marketing materials used come directly from -or at least have the final approval of -the drug's manufacturer.
V. Conclusion
Innovator liability and co-promoter liability both seek to hold liable a company that did not manufacture, distribute, or sell the product that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries. While neither theory has garnered majority support as yet, proponents of each have established important beachheads that present substantial litigation risks to pharmaceutical companies. These emerging theories of liability should be factored into future business planning. 60 Although the exact terms of Takeda and Lilly's contract have not been made public, it is notable that Takeda has reserved the right to dispute Lilly's claim, based on an indemnification agreement in the contract, that Takeda agreed to indemnify Lilly for losses in Actos litigation. See Lance Duroni, Takeda Won't Commit to Cover Eli Lilly for $9B Verdict, LAW 360, Apr. 24, 2014, available at http://www. law360.com/articles/531635/takeda-won-tcommit-to-cover-eli-lilly-for-9b-verdict.
